The Formation of GM-free and GM Coasean Clubs : Will They Form and If So How Much Can They Achieve? by Punt, Maarten J. & Wesseler, Justus
 
The Formation of GM-free and GM Coasean Clubs: Will They Form and If So 
How Much Can They Achieve? 
Punt, M. J., & Wesseler, J. 
 
This article is made publically available in the institutional repository of Wageningen 
University and Research, under article 25fa of the Dutch Copyright Act, also known 
as the Amendment Taverne. 
Article 25fa states that the author of a short scientific work funded either wholly or 
partially by Dutch public funds is entitled to make that work publicly available for no 
consideration following a reasonable period of time after the work was first 
published, provided that clear reference is made to the source of the first publication 
of the work. 
For questions regarding the public availability of this article, please contact 
openscience.library@wur.nl. 
Please cite this publication as follows: 
Punt, M. J., & Wesseler, J. (2018). The Formation of GM-free and GM Coasean Clubs: 
Will They Form and If So How Much Can They Achieve? Journal of Agricultural 
Economics, 69(2), 413-438. https://doi.org/10.1111/1477-9552.12235 
The Formation of GM-free and GM
Coasean Clubs: Will They Form and If
So How Much Can They Achieve?
Maarten J. Punt and Justus Wesseler1
(Original submitted January 2017, revision received April 2017, accepted June
2017.)
Abstract
The unintended presence of traces of genetically modiﬁed (GM) crops in the har-
vests of non-GM crops plays a prominent role in the debate over the coexistence of
GM and non-GM crops. One way to address the issue is the formation of GM-free
or GM-only clubs. We model the decisions of individual farmers to cultivate either
GM or non-GM crops and combine this with a game theoretic model of club forma-
tion to investigate the feasibility of such clubs. We consider two liability regimes:
GM farmers are liable or they are not. We consider two benchmarks: Nash equilib-
rium without negotiations and the eﬃcient allocation and compare those with par-
tial co-operation through a Coasean club. We ﬁnd that in both regimes a relatively
large club can form but they are not always necessary to reach the eﬃcient alloca-
tion. In fact, if farmers can freely decide under proﬁt maximisation what to culti-
vate, they reach 95% of an eﬃcient allocation. This holds independent of the
property rights system and provides strong support for coexistence policies based
on ex-post liability such as in the US and Spain.
Keywords: Club formation; coalition formation; ex-post liability; game theory;
GM coexistence.
JEL classifications: Q15, R32, C72.
1. Introduction
Although the societal debate on genetically modiﬁed (GM) food and feed is far from
settled (Smart et al., 2015), GM and non-GM crops are grown all over the world,
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often close together.2 In the European Union and the United States, as well as many
other states and regions of the world, there is an increasing call to guarantee both pro-
ducers and consumers of agricultural products their freedom of choice. For example,
in its recommendation on guidelines for coexistence the European Commission (2010)
states: ‘In principle, farmers should be able to cultivate the types of agricultural crops
they choose – be it GM crops, conventional or organic crops’. In the same document
the Commission also notes that: ‘This possibility should be combined with the wish of
some farmers and operators to ensure that their crops have the lowest possible pres-
ence of GMOs [genetically modiﬁed organisms]’ (2010). Finally it also wants ‘to pro-
vide European consumers with a choice between GM food and non-GM food’ (2010).
Similarly, the US Department of Agriculture (2015) states: ‘Coexistence refers to the
concurrent cultivation of conventional, organic, IP [identity preserved], and geneti-
cally engineered (GE) crops consistent with underlying consumer preferences and
farmer choices. Farmers and others in the food and feed production chain have an
important role in collaborating to make coexistence work, particularly in the areas of
stewardship, contracting and attention to gene ﬂow’.
In order to oﬀer a choice between GM and non-GM food, both food types have to
be supplied through segregated supply chains, with important implications. First, the
crops produced with each system have to be separated throughout the supply chain to
preserve their identity, and this separation starts at the farm level. Second, as con-
sumers are unable to determine the origin of products, whether organic, conventional
or GM, for themselves, the products have to be labelled to achieve successful product
diﬀerentiation. The labelling itself can be either positive or negative and does not nec-
essarily apply to all retail food products. Moreover, it is generally agreed that some
consumers are willing to pay a price premium for non-GM products, although its size
is debated (Scatasta et al., 2007). Clearly, if farmers are able to capture a part of this
premium, they have an incentive to separate their crops. Cultivating GM crops, in
contrast, often provides a cost advantage, yield advantage or both (Qaim, 2009),
though with a possible price discount.
A problem, however, is that GM crops can accidentally cross-pollinate nearby non-
GM varieties (adventitious presence). This generates an externality if these ﬁelds are
owned by diﬀerent farmers, since neighbours can no longer capture the price premium
due to the adventitious presence. As pointed out by Coase (1960) this externality is
reciprocal: the farmer cultivating GM crops (henceforth ‘GM farmer’) causes an
external eﬀect by planting GM crops and causing adventitious presence. One might,
however, argue that the farmer cultivating non-GM crops (henceforth ‘non-GM
farmer’) causes an external eﬀect by planting a non-GM crop near a GM ﬁeld, thus
risking adventitious presence.3 Who has to bear the costs is governed by the property
rights system that is in place. In Europe, GM farmers are generally liable for adventi-
tious presence. In the US and Canada, the system is reversed and the problem mainly
occurs for organic farming sold under certain private labels that require no
2We refer here to the deﬁnition of genetically modiﬁed organisms (GMOs) as deﬁned by the
European Commission, acknowledging that this deﬁnition is a political construct (Smart et al.,
2015) and controversial from a natural science point of view (Herring, 2008). Also, sometimes
we diﬀerentiate non-GM crops into conventional and organic.
3The situation described here can equally be thought of as a ‘local commons setting’ (Seabright,
1993). The common that is shared by a limited number of farmers is the pollen cloud and the
farmers disagree about how much GM pollen this cloud is allowed to contain.
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adventitious presence. The US Department of Agriculture’s organic label is process
based and allows adventitious presence (Beckmann et al., 2011). Farmers can reduce
the probability of adventitious presence by taking ex-ante coexistence measures such
as buﬀer zones, isolation distances, and diﬀerences in sowing time. The costs of these
measures, too, are borne by the liable party. Another way is the formation of volun-
tary clubs that pay other farmers in the landscape to cultivate a speciﬁc crop type
(henceforth ‘buy out’).
Voluntary clubs initiated by farmers are of interest under both liability regimes. If
GM farmers are not liable, as in the US and Canada, conventional or organic farmers
could form a club and only cultivate conventional or organic crops. This would allow
them to have access to the GM-free price premium, with a lower risk of losing it due
to adventitious presence. Moreover, these clubs can reduce the costs of ex-ante coexis-
tence measures. In the US, for example, organic farmers have dealt with these issues
through co-operative agreements (see e.g. McEvoy, 2013). If, in contrast, GM farmers
are liable for adventitious presence, as in Europe, they could form a club and agree
among each other to cultivate only GM crops in their region. This would allow them
to have access to the superior GM variety and reduce both the ex-ante costs of the
coexistence measures and the expected costs of ex-post liability.4 An example of such
a club in Portugal is described in Skevas et al. (2010). Moreover, if some of the farm-
ers in that region still had an economic preference for non-GM crops, the cost savings
introduced through the reduced ex-ante and expected ex-post costs could be used to
buy these farmers out.
Under both liability regimes clubs reduce the ex-ante coexistence costs and mitigate
the risks of adventitious presence of GM crops in non-GM ﬁelds. If GM farmers are
non-liable, these clubs reduce potential price premium losses for non-GM farmers; if
GM farmers are liable, clubs reduce the probability and amount of compensation
payments for GM farmers. The problem for any club is that farmers outside the club
enjoy the beneﬁts, without bearing the costs – the free-riding problem – and it may
prove diﬃcult to form a club that can solve the externality problem completely. Clubs
and the associated free-rider problem have received relatively little attention in the
coexistence literature. To the best of our knowledge only Consm€uller et al. (2012),
Furtan et al. (2007) and Skevas et al. (2010) address clubs, but they do not consider
strategic incentives and free-riding.
In this article we use the basic model of Beckmann and Wesseler (2007) to model
individual farmers’ decisions and extend it in two directions: (1) we make the model
completely spatially explicit, and (2) we use it to investigate the possibility and eﬃ-
ciency of forming a GM-only or GM-free club in the landscape, accounting explicitly
for the free-riding possibilities. The contribution of this article is therefore the consid-
eration of strategic incentives in club formation in a spatially explicit model under
both liability regimes. To the best of our knowledge we are also the ﬁrst to investigate
the potential problem of free-riding for GM-only and GM-free clubs.
Whether a GM-only or GM-free club is formed depends on the liability regime, as
described above. Such a club is formed to mitigate problems of adventitious presence
4An interesting feature in Europe is that there are GM-free regions too, even though GM farm-
ers would be liable in case of adventitious presence. This suggests that either the farmers do not
trust the legal system (e.g. because of the diﬃculty of proof or high up-front costs) or that these
regions are formed out of other concerns, such as tourism or social pressure. The latter are some
of the main reasons found in the analysis by Consm€uller et al. (2012).
 2017 The Agricultural Economics Society
Formation and Achievements of GM-Free and GM Clubs 415
and engages in Coasean bargaining, hence the name Coasean clubs. More formally
we deﬁne Coasean clubs as: ‘Clubs that seek to maximise the aggregate welfare of
their members through a system of side payments towards those that have the prop-
erty rights’. In our case the property rights refer to either the right to a GM-free har-
vest, or the right to cultivate GM crops. To be able to compare the two diﬀerent
property rights system, we assume a several liability regime, where a GM farmer on
the one hand will be liable for adventitious presence according to his contribution,
while a non-GM farmer will be ‘liable’ according to the adventitious presence he
receives.
We proceed as follows: We ﬁrst introduce the related literature. Next, we present a
basic farmer decision model in two variants: when the GM farmer is not liable and
when liable. We then consider two benchmarks: the Nash equilibrium without negoti-
ations, and an eﬃcient conﬁguration. Then clubs are introduced, and we investigate
their stability. Because the analytical results of club stability are inconclusive, we then
conduct simulations to investigate the stability of clubs and what they achieve. The
ﬁnal section discusses the results and concludes the article.
2. Related Literature
Beckmann and Wesseler (2007) and Beckmann et al. (2011) addressed spatial incen-
tives due to adventitious presence in general. They found that the boundary between
choosing one crop type or another shifts depending on the division of property rights
between GM and non-GM farmers, but has no eﬀect on the ﬁnal eﬃcient allocation.
They further show that this can be diﬀerent if mandatory coexistence regulations are
imposed. Beckmann and Wesseler (2007) do consider a number of technical measures
to reduce the adventitious presence. They do not, however, consider explicit spatial
measures or the possibility of club formation.
Groeneveld et al. (2013) studied the combination of spatially explicit measures and
individual farmer’s cultivation choices, and how these depend on the crop choices of
their neighbours. They studied the incentives associated with a minimum distance
requirement between GMO and non-GMO cultivation in the dairy industry and
found that minimum distance requirements had a domino-eﬀect, causing farmers to
switch to other crop types because of the minimum distance requirement. However,
Groeneveld et al. (2013) use a case study of Dutch dairy farms and therefore only
consider one liability regime with mandatory minimum distance requirements and no
club formation.
Moschini (2015) investigates a spatial setting, where the individual GM farmer or
non-GM farmer must comply with coexistence regulations. Under the assumption of
exogenous coexistence regulations he ﬁnds that sharing the costs equally between GM
and non-GM farmers is the welfare maximising solution. Our contribution diﬀers, as
we start with the assumptions that speciﬁc coexistence policies are not in place and
investigate, ﬁrst, how close we get to the eﬃcient allocation of land without imposing
any additional regulation, and second, if the formation of clubs would be feasible,
and if so, how much eﬃciency gain can be achieved.
GM-free clubs have been investigated by Furtan et al. (2007). In their model,
organic farmers form a club, drawing up a binding agreement to cultivate only
organic crops. Furthermore, the club buys out former GM farmers to establish a buf-
fer zone of conventional cultivation around its land. Furtan et al. (2007) ﬁnd that
such clubs are feasible, in the sense that the captured premium is enough to
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compensate the former GM farmers. They do not, however, consider the individual
incentives for farmers to join or exit such clubs. In contrast to Furtan et al. (2007) we
take a strategic approach, that is, we look at the incentives for farmers to join a club,
or to leave it once it has been formed. These incentives are investigated through the
notion of cartel stability, ﬁrst described by D’Aspremont et al. (1983) and later used
in the environmental and resource agreements literature (see e.g. Dellink et al., 2008;
Weikard, 2009; and Pintassilgo et al., 2010) and more recently to study local commu-
nity resource management (Ansink and Bouma, 2013). This model is non-co-opera-
tive, but given that we deal with voluntary clubs we believe it is well suited.
3. Model Description
We assume farmers have a single ﬁeld that they can plant with either a GM crop or a
non-GM crop. We will assume that the non-GM crop commands a price premium
over the GM crop, whereas the GM crop is cheaper to produce. More formally, we
have a landscape that contains a set N of farmers, denoted i.
The price a farmer i 2 N can claim given the quality of the crop is pG for the GM
crop and pC for the non-GM crop. Although prices would in principle be farmer
speciﬁc, due for instance to quality diﬀerences, we do not consider these diﬀerences in
this model. Without loss of generality, we normalize the cost of producing GM crops
to zero, and denote the additional costs of cultivating non-GM crops for farmer i as
ci. This situation does not necessarily reﬂect reality everywhere, as a combination of
ex-ante regulatory costs5 and additional seed costs may drive the costs of cultivating
GM crops beyond those of conventional crops (Venus et al., 2017). In these situa-
tions, however, no-one would adopt GM crops.
If both costs and prices are equal across farmers, there would be no externality
eﬀect because all farmers either plant GM or non-GM crops, depending on the price
premium and additional costs. However, often farmers do not face identical condi-
tions, nor are their farms identical, due for instance to diﬀerences in landscape, land
quality, managerial quality and machinery owned.
In the absence of adventitious presence, an individual farmer i will choose non-GM
crops if per unit of production:
pC  ci pG; ð1Þ
and will choose GM crops otherwise. We further divide the set N into two ﬁxed sub-
sets Φ and Χ, Φ ⊆ N, Χ ⊆ N, deﬁned through condition (1):
U ¼ i 2 NjDp cif g
X ¼ i 2 NjDp\cif g;
ð2Þ
5We do not model ex-ante regulatory costs explicitly because this would require assumptions
about when and by whom these costs should be incurred, taking away the generality of the
model. We acknowledge those costs can be substantial as Beckmann et al. (2010) have pointed
out. These costs are implicitly considered in the cost diﬀerence between GM crops and non-GM
crops, although we never allow them to exceed the additional costs of conventional crops. We
investigate their eﬀects later in the simulations.
 2017 The Agricultural Economics Society
Formation and Achievements of GM-Free and GM Clubs 417
where Dp ¼ pC  pG: The subsets Φ and X are independent of the actual cultivation
decisions by farmers, which may change because of the presence of the externality.
The externality is introduced in the basic model through a potential reduction in
the price premium due to adventitious presence. If GM farmers are not liable, the
costs of this potential reduction are borne by the non-GM farmers; if GM farmers are
liable, they bear the costs. We further divide the set of farmers N into two subsets, F
and G, which describe the cultivation decisions of the farmers. The set F consists of
i 2 N that choose to cultivate non-GM crops. The set G consists of j 2 N that choose
to cultivate GM crops. Given that GM crops are often the new trait or variety, if a
farmer moves from set F to set G, we will refer to such a move as ‘switching’, that is,
switching from cultivating non-GM to GM crops. Moving from set G to set F, in con-
trast, will be referred to as ‘reverting’.
We denote aij as the probability that farmer i that grows the non-GM crop is
aﬀected by farmer j. Equivalently, we can think of aij as the proportion of the harvest
of farmer i that is aﬀected because farmer j produces GM crops. In principle aij can be
inﬂuenced by technical measures and is distance dependent. Moreover, it depends on
the cultivation decisions F and G:
aij ¼ 0 if i 2 G or j 2 FfðdijÞ

; ð3Þ
where f(dij) is a monotonically decreasing function of the distance dij between farmer i
and j. Then, given aij and the cultivation decisions, the probability that farmer i is not
aﬀected is:
Ai ¼
Y
j2N
1 aij
  8i 2 N: ð4Þ
The proﬁts of farmers depend on the liability regime and their crop choice. We
introduce the double superscripts l to indicate that GM farmers are liable, and n for
when they are not.
When GM farmers are not liable for adventitious presence, the harvest of nearby
non-GM farmers may have to be sold as GM crops, due to adventitious presence.
Therefore, the expected proﬁt of a non-GM and a GM farmer per unit of production
are respectively:
pC
n
i ¼ AipC þ 1 Aið ÞpG  ci ¼ AiDpþ pG  ci 8i 2 F;
pG
n
j ¼ pG 8j 2 G:
ð5Þ
When GM farmers are liable for adventitious presence, in principle they have to
compensate all the non-GM farmers that they aﬀect for the damage incurred. We
assume several liability, i.e. among liable farmers everyone has to pay a share of the
damage, proportional to the probability that they caused this damage (Koch, 2008).
The probability that farmer i suﬀers from adventitious presence is (1  Ai). The
total expected compensation that GM farmer j has to pay is then:
X
i2N
aij 1 Aið ÞDpP
k2N aik
¼ DjDp; ð6Þ
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where Dj ¼
P
i2N
aijð1AiÞP
k2N aik
; and k is an index running over all farmers. Given that aik
equals zero whenever the receiving farmer is a GM farmer or the sending farmer is a
conventional farmer, the sum represents the sum of the probabilities of those GM
farmers aﬀecting farmer i. Consequently, the expected proﬁts of a non-GM and a
GM farmer per unit of production are respectively:
pC
l
i ¼ pC  ci ¼ Dpþ pG  ci 8i 2 F;
pG
l
j ¼ pG DjDp 8j 2 G:
ð7Þ
We now consider two benchmarks: the Nash equilibrium when no negotiations take
place and an eﬃcient conﬁguration. When no negotiations take place each farmer
optimises their payoﬀ, given the behaviour of others. They do not co-ordinate their
cultivation choices and do not compensate each other to switch or revert. Equiva-
lently, one can consider this as a case where transaction costs for bargaining are pro-
hibitive. This situation is not meant as an actual description of reality but used as a
reference point for the farmers that consider what would happen, if no-one makes side
payments. As Beckmann et al. (2011) show, this results in an increase in the farm
rents for the type of cultivation that gets the property rights, and given zero transac-
tion costs for bargaining over the cultivation allocation of land between neighbours
the farmers maximise the sum of their payoﬀs, and the cultivation decisions under
both systems of property rights will be equivalent.
3.1. The Nash equilibrium without negotiations
In our model farmers choose either GM or non-GM crops; consequently, we are deal-
ing with an integer problem. The marginal eﬀectME from switching from non-GM to
GM crops for farmer k is therefore, from (5):
ME ¼ pG  AkDpþ pG  ck
  ¼ ck  AkDp: ð8Þ
The marginal beneﬁts of switching to GM are the incremental costs saved when
farming GM, the marginal costs of switching are the expected realized price premium
that is given up. Consequently, a farmer k will switch from non-GM to GM if
ck > AkDp. In the Nash equilibrium no individual player has an incentive to deviate.
Therefore, in the Nash equilibrium, when GM farmers are not liable the following
must hold:
ciAiDp 8i 2 Fn
cjAjDp 8j 2 Gn ; ð9Þ
where F
n
and G
n
denote the equilibrium sets with cultivation decisions when GM
farmers are not liable. Online Appendix S1 establishes that equilibrium (9) always
exists, but is not necessarily unique.
Since the set U ¼ fi 2 NjDpi cig, whereas Fn ¼ fi2 NjAiDpi cig and 0Ai 1,
F
n
is a subset of Φ. The presence of the externality requires that farmers account for
the expected price premium rather than the price premium itself. In this Nash equilib-
rium, farmers cultivate non-GM crops only if the expected price premium is larger
than the additional costs of non-GM crops.
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A feature of our model is that the marginal costs of switching go down the larger is
the number of GM farmers. The reason is that the expected revenue from cultivating
non-GM crops decreases with an increasing number of GM farmers. This also implies
that some sort of a domino eﬀect can be present: it may only pay for some farmers to
switch once a number of others have switched.
If the property rights lie with the non-GM farmer, the marginal eﬀect from switch-
ing for farmer k is:
ME ¼ pG DkDp
  Dpþ pG  ck 
¼ ck  1þDkð ÞDp:
ð10Þ
The marginal beneﬁts of switching to GM are the incremental costs saved when
farming GM, the marginal costs are the price premium that is given up plus the
expected compensation paid to other non-GM farmers. In the Nash equilibrium no
individual player has an incentive to deviate. Therefore, in the Nash equilibrium
where the GM farmers are liable, the following must hold:
ci 1þDið ÞDp 8i 2 Fl
cj 1þDj
 
Dp 8j 2 Gl ; ð11Þ
where F
l
and G
l
denote the equilibrium cultivation decisions when GM farmers are
liable. Online Appendix S1 establishes that equilibrium (11) always exists, though
again, is not necessarily unique. Since the set X ¼ i 2 NjDpi\cif g, whereas
G
l ¼ i 2 Nj 1þDj
 
Dpi\ci
 
and Dj 0 8i 2 N, Gl is a subset of X. In this Nash
equilibrium, farmers cultivate GM crops only if the additional costs of non-GM farm-
ing are larger than a multiple of the price premium. Obviously, under this property
rights regime, switching is less attractive: not only does a switching farmer give up the
full price premium, but in addition the farmer faces expected liability for damages of
the non-GM neighbours. Thus, the larger the number of non-GM farmers is, the lar-
ger are the costs to the GM farmers.
Consequently, when there are no negotiations and everyone optimises their own
payoﬀ, an individual ﬁnds it generally more attractive to cultivate the crop type that
has the property rights.
3.2. The eﬃcient conﬁguration
Consistently with Beckmann and Wesseler (2007) and Beckmann et al. (2011) we
deﬁne an eﬃcient allocation as the allocation where the sum of the proﬁts of all farm-
ers in a region is maximised. In that case all external eﬀects are internalised and the
ﬁnal results are the same for both systems of property rights in terms of the conﬁgura-
tion, although the distribution of beneﬁts and costs over the individual farmers is dif-
ferent. When GM farmers are not liable, total proﬁtsW are:
W ¼
X
i2F
AiDpþ pG  ci
 þX
j2G
pG: ð12Þ
The marginal eﬀect ME on total proﬁt W of farmer k switching from non-GM to
GM crops is:
 2017 The Agricultural Economics Society
420 Maarten J. Punt and Justus Wesseler
ME ¼ ck  AkDp
X
i2N
aikAiDpð Þ: ð13Þ
The marginal beneﬁts to society of a switching farmer consist of ck, the original
additional costs of farmer k when cultivating non-GM crops. The marginal costs
consist of the expected price premium lost by farmer k plus the sum of the addi-
tional reduction in price premium of all the other non-GM farmers, which is the
external eﬀect. Although the last term in (13) is summed over the full set N,
aik ¼ 0 8i 2 G, and hence the reduction in price premium only applies to non-GM
farmers. In an eﬃcient conﬁguration, switching continues until the marginal costs
exceed the marginal beneﬁts, that is, in an eﬃcient conﬁguration the following
holds:
ciAiDpþ
P
l2N
aliAlDpð Þ 8i 2 FE
cjAjDpþ
P
l2N
aljAlDp
  8j 2 GE; ð14Þ
where FE and GE denote the eﬃcient cultivation decisions.
According to the Coase theorem, in the absence of transaction costs, the eﬃcient
solution can be reached independently of the initial allocation of property rights. To
see this, assume we allocate the property rights to the non-GM farmers and sum all
proﬁts:
W ¼
X
i2F
Dpþ pG  ci
 þX
j2G
pG DjDp
 
¼
X
i2F
Dpþ pG  ci
 þX
j2G
pG
 X
i2N
1 Aið ÞDpð Þ ð15Þ
Note that by (3) and (4) Ai ¼ 18i 2 G. The corresponding marginal eﬀect from a
non-GM farmer k switching to GM crops is:
ME ¼ ck  AkDp
X
i2N
aikAiDp ð16Þ
Although the switching farmer is losing the full price premium when switching, the
net eﬀect is only the expected price premium because the rest is a transfer from the
GM farmers. The last term is the increase in expected damages the GM farmers now
have to pay because the probability of adventitious presence has increased for the
remaining non-GM farmers. Because the marginal eﬀect is the same, the optimum
must also be the same. We show in online Appendix S1 that an eﬃcient conﬁguration
is not necessarily privately optimal.
If all farmers could negotiate together and compensate each other through multilat-
eral agreements at zero costs the externality could be internalised. However, many
agents are involved, and in some cases agreements between multiple farmers are
required for the compensation that is to be settled. This leads to a co-ordination prob-
lem because farmers have to co-ordinate who pays whom, and all farmers prefer the
others to pay. This in turn leads to free-riding and the fully eﬃcient allocation may
not be achieved. In the next section we investigate whether partial co-operation
through clubs is feasible.
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4. The Formation of Coasean Clubs
4.1. Preliminaries
If non-GM farmers are liable, a number of them may form a club, pool their proﬁts
and compensate a number of GM farmers for reversion to non-GM farming. This will
increase their proﬁts because it lowers the probability that their harvests will be
aﬀected by adventitious presence. These are the economic incentives to form a club.
However, such a club also increases the proﬁts of the non-GM farmers outside the
club – there is an incentive to free-ride.
Similarly, if GM farmers are liable they may form a club, pool their proﬁts, and
compensate a number of non-GM farmers for switching to GM.6 This reduces the
expected damages to be paid, but again this holds for GM farmers both inside and
outside the club, with possible free-riding eﬀects.
We assume that a single club can be formed among the players with the largest
incentive to form a club. Thus if GM farmers are not liable, the potential club mem-
bers are those farmers for whom Dp[ ci holds (set Φ), and if GM farmers are liable,
the farmers for whom Dp\ci holds (set X). To keep the model simple we will assume
open membership, that is, current members cannot bar entry of other farmers that
want to join the club.
Club formation is modelled as a three-stage game following Barrett (2001). In the
ﬁrst stage the farmers in set Φ (X) announce their membership decisions. In the second
stage the club members S  U ðT  XÞ engage in Coasean bargaining with all mem-
bers of set X (Φ), maximising the sum of the proﬁts of the club members and the farm-
ers in set X (Φ). In the third stage non-members pick their cultivation type
independently. The game is solved through backward induction.
We introduce Coasean bargaining in the second stage of the game to abstract from
the issue of modelling the actual bargaining process, as well as the order of oﬀers, and
the size of the side payments. We assume that farmers will simply switch or revert if
the farmer in question gets at least the proﬁt diﬀerence between GM and non-GM cul-
tivation. The farmers addressed in this bargaining process have a dominant strategy
to cultivate the other type, unless they are bought out, and hence there is no pre-emp-
tive behaviour.
We deﬁne a partition function that assigns a payoﬀ to every player outside the club
as well as to the club as a whole. The stability of a club is investigated with cartel sta-
bility concepts originally derived by D’Aspremont et al. (1983). A club of S members
is internally stable if no member in the club can gain by leaving the club, that is,
Vk Sð ÞVk Snkð Þ 8k 2 S; ð17Þ
where Vk(S) is the payoﬀ to club member k if in club S and Vk(S\k) is the payoﬀ
to club member k if not a club member, but the rest of the club stays intact. Simi-
larly, a club is externally stable if no player outside the club can gain by joining
the club:
6The incentives increase even more under joint and several liability, where one of the liable
farmers has to pay the full damages and it becomes the obligation of defendants to sort out
the share of payments, or joint liability, where just one of the liable farmers has to pay for
the full damage and there is no obligation that other liable farmers have to contribute
(Koch, 2008).
 2017 The Agricultural Economics Society
422 Maarten J. Punt and Justus Wesseler
Vo Sð Þ[Vo S [ oð Þ 8o 2 NnS; ð18Þ
where Vo(S ∪ o) is the payoﬀ to club member o who joins club S.
7
Clearly internal and external stability depend on the sharing rule used within the
club. We do not specify an explicit sharing rule but use the Claim Rights Condition
(CRC) (Weikard, 2009). A club is internally stable if each member can be paid at least
the amount received if leaving the club (the ‘claim’). The remaining surplus can then
be shared in any arbitrary way. Thus for the CRC to be satisﬁed we must have:X
k2S
Vk Sð Þ
X
k2S
Vk Snkð Þ: ð19Þ
Moreover, as Weikard (2009) shows, a club is externally stable if it cannot be
enlarged to a club that satisﬁes the CRC. This guarantees the existence of at least one
Nash equilibrium in the ﬁrst stage, if the Nash equilibrium in the last stage is unique
for each club that could form.
The use of the CRC and Coasean bargaining in the second stage also allows us to
establish the following theorem:
Theorem When clubs are formed by the farmers in set Φ (X), the result of the CRC
when all farmers in set X (Φ) are considered club members is equivalent to the result
of the CRC when only those farmers in set X (Φ) that are bought out are considered
members and equivalent to the result of the CRC when none of the farmers of set X
(Φ) are considered members.
Proof See online Appendix S1.
The intuition is that when farmers S  U form the club, the farmers of set X always
have the same claim: pG, and they are only bought out if the sum of the gains of the S
farmers in the club outweighs the required compensation.
We use this feature within our simulations, but for clarity of the presentation we
will not consider bought-out farmers as club members when we present our results,
analytical or otherwise. Thus bought-out farmers or the wider set of farmers consid-
ered in Coasean bargaining are not considered or referred to as members. In contrast
to the literature on environmental and ﬁsheries agreements (e.g. Finus, 2003; Pintas-
silgo et al., 2010) we do, however, allow for a club size 1, that is, an individual farmer
trying to negotiate with neighbours.8
4.2. Analysis
Non-GM clubs form when GM farmers are non-liable, hence the proﬁt functions used
for individual farmers are those in (5). If a number of non-GM farmers form a club
S ⊆ Φ, pool their proﬁts, and buy out H ⊆ X GM farmers, the club earns9 :
7The tie-breaking rule implies that if a member is indiﬀerent between joining and not joining,
the member will join, and is introduced following Weikard (2009).
8As a consequence in the literature on environmental agreements, there are 2 Uj j  Uj jð2 Xj j  Xj jÞ
possible clubs; in our model there are 2 Uj j ð2 Xj jÞ possible clubs.
9By Theorem 1 and the fact that we use Coasean bargaining we could have equally formulated
the proﬁts of the club as including the bought-out GM farmers as members, or even all GM
farmers in set X. The stability results would have been the same.
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pS ¼
X
i2S
pið Þ
 !
þ
X
h2H
AhDp chð Þ
 !
: ð20Þ
The ﬁrst term of (20) is left unspeciﬁed because it is in principle possible that a
member of S cultivates GM crops. The last term is negative because H ⊆ X and
X ¼ i 2 NjDp\cif g; and 0Ai 18i 2 N: This term constitutes the compensation
payments to the reverted GM farmers.
In the second stage of the game the club S maximises:
maxðpS þ
X
i2X
piÞ: ð21Þ
For the remaining singletons the conditions in (9) still apply. As a result the Nash
equilibrium in the last stage can be characterised as follows:
8i 2 FCC
ciAiDpf g& i 2 UnSf g
or
ci  AiDp
P
l2S[X
aliAlDpþ
P
k2UnS
akiAkDp
 !( )
& i 2 S [ Xð Þf g
8>><>>>:
8j 2 GCC
cjAjDp
 
& j 2 UnSf g
or
cj  AjDp
P
l2S[X
aljAlDpþ
P
k2UnS
akiAkDp
 !( )
& j 2 S[Xf g
8>><>>:
ð22Þ
where F
CC
and G
CC
denote the Nash equilibrium decisions of the last stage when
non-GM clubs are present. The intuition behind this equilibrium is as follows: Farm-
ers that are not a member of club S or targeted by club S in Coasean bargaining still
follow the conditions in (9). Members of S or those targeted in Coasean bargaining
will only cultivate non-GM crops if the compensation payment required not to culti-
vate GM crops is smaller than the marginal external eﬀect of their GM cultivation on
S plus the eﬀect of other farmers that will revert as a consequence of this buyout. The
last eﬀect is accounted for because the club moves ﬁrst with its Coasean bargaining.
The equilibria in (22) include the eﬃcient solution and Nash equilibrium without
negotiations as special cases for S = Φ and S = ∅, respectively.
Having established the equilibrium in the last stages, we move to the ﬁrst stage. The
stability of club S depends on the outside option payoﬀs. The outside option payoﬀ of
the non-GM farmer i is the payoﬀ received if club S\i is formed. Summing all claims
we ﬁnd: X
i2S
A0iDpþ pGi  ci
  ð23Þ
where A0iDp denotes the expected price premium of farmer i in the last stage of the
game when the club S\i is formed, that is, when free-riding. If we deduct (23) from
(20) we ﬁnd that the claim rights condition holds if:
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X
i2S
Ai  A0i
 
Dp
 þX
h2H
AhDp ch
 
[ 0 ð24Þ
In (24) the ﬁrst term is the sum of the gains of the club members relative to being
outside of the club, whereas the last term is the compensation payments made to the
bought-out GM farmers. Recall that the last term of (24) is always negative. Thus, for
a club to be stable, the sum of the gains from joining club S of all members must be
larger than the sum of compensation payments. Moreover, clubs are more likely to be
stable if they achieve more than the clubs that form with one member less. In contrast,
if a club without this farmer achieves exactly the same, there is no reason to join the
club, as one will be obliged to be involved in the compensation payments without any
additional gains.
If the GM farmers are liable, the payoﬀ functions of the farmers change. If a club
T  X of GM farmers compensates U  U non-GM farmers, the club earns:
pT ¼
X
u2U
cu  1þDuð ÞDpð Þ
 !
þ
X
t2T
pt
 !
: ð25Þ
The ﬁrst term of (25) is the total of compensation that has to be paid to farmers that
the club buys out. Since U  U ¼ i 2 NjDp cif g and Di 08i 2 N, this ﬁrst term is
negative. The last term is again unspeciﬁed, for reasons given above.
In the last stage the conditions in (11) still apply to the remaining singletons,
whereas in the second stage the club maximises:
maxðpT þ
X
i2U
piÞ: ð26Þ
Therefore, the equilibrium in the third stage can be characterised as follows:
8i 2 FGC
ci 1þDið ÞDpf g& i 2 XnTÞf g
or
1þDið ÞDp ci
P
t2T[U
Dt D0t
 
Dp
 
& i 2 ðT[UÞf g
8><>:
8j 2 GGC
cj 1þDj
 
Dp
 
& j 2 XnTf g
or
1þDj
 
Dp cj
P
t2T[U
Dt D0t
 
Dp
 
& j 2 ðT[UÞf g
8>><>>:
ð27Þ
where D0t denotes the new damage payments for t 2 T [ U; when the player switches.
F
GC
and G
GC
denote the Nash equilibrium decisions of the last stage when GM clubs
are present. The intuition behind this equilibrium is as follows: Farmers that are not a
member of club T or targeted by club T in Coasean bargaining still follow the condi-
tions in (11). Members of T or those targeted in Coasean bargaining will only culti-
vate GM crops if the compensation payment required not to cultivate non-GM crops
is smaller than the marginal external eﬀect their non-GM cultivation has on T. This
eﬀect consists of four parts: the reduction in payments from T to j because j no longer
cultivates non-GM crops; the reduction in payments to other non-GM farmers
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because the total burden is shared by more GM farmers; an increase in payments
because of the additional adventitious presence; and a decrease because of the other
non-GM farmers that will revert as a result of the buying out (see online Appendix S1
for details). The last eﬀect is accounted for because the club moves ﬁrst with its Coa-
sean bargaining. The equilibria in (22) include the eﬃcient solution and Nash equilib-
rium without negotiations as special cases for T = X and T = ∅, respectively.
Having established the equilibrium in the last stages, we move to the ﬁrst stage. The
stability of club T depends on the outside option payoﬀs. The outside option payoﬀ
of the farmers in club T is the payoﬀ they get if a club is formed with the same GM
farmers, but without them personally. Summing all claims we ﬁnd:
X
j2T
pG D0jDp
 	
; ð28Þ
where D0jDp denotes the expected compensation to be paid by j if j leaves club T, that
is, when free-riding. Deducting (28) from (25) we ﬁnd that the claim rights condition
holds if: X
k2U
ck  1þDkð ÞDpð Þ þ
X
j2T
D0j Dj
 	
Dp[ 0: ð29Þ
The ﬁrst term of (29) is the total compensation that has to be paid to farmers that
the club buys out; the second term is the reduction in the compensation that has to be
paid to non-GM farmers if farmer j joins the club. The ﬁrst term is always negative,
whereas the second term is positive if a larger club achieves more than any of the
smaller ones, and zero otherwise. Thus, for a club to be stable, the sum of the gains
from joining club T in reducing the compensation payments to non-GM farmers must
be larger than the sum of compensation payments within the club.
The intuition is similar to that for non-GM clubs. Clubs are more likely to be stable
if they achieve more than smaller clubs; if not, there is no reason to join.
4.3. Simulations
Within the previous model, more precise results about what clubs would form and
what they would achieve in eﬃciency terms can only be obtained through simulations.
In this section we investigate the Nash equilibrium without negotiation, the eﬃcient
conﬁguration, that is, we select among all possible allocations the one that generates
the largest sum of proﬁts over all farms and clubs in a grid10 for both liability regimes.
We assume that the individual probability of adventitious presence aij is a declining
function of Euclidian distance between farmer i and j. The parameter values are given
in Table 1.
In online Appendix S2 we report the individual probabilities aij resulting from our
distance function, as well as the frequency distribution of the overall adventitious
presence 1 Aið Þ over all possible conﬁgurations and farmers. The price of GM crops
is based on the average price of maize in European countries in the period 2000–2005
(Eurostat). The price premium for certiﬁed non-GM soybeans has been relatively
10We show results for a line with eight farmers as well in online Appendix S3.
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stable at 10% (U. Felh€olter, feed retailer, cited in Wesseler, 2014). For many other
crops it has been even less (Foster, 2010). Therefore, we have assumed a price of non-
GM crops that is 10% higher than that of GM crops. The range of additional costs
and the distance function were chosen such that both types of cultivation would be
practiced in the draws.
Following Pintassilgo et al. (2010) we investigate three important parameters: the
stability likelihood h, the eﬃciency gain Ω (called ‘social gain’ in Pintassilgo et al.),11
and closing the gap Γ. Stability likelihood is the probability that a random m size club
is stable and is estimated through the sampling proportion:
bhm ¼ Y
ndrw
where Y is the number of times a randomly chosen m-size club was stable and ndrw is
the total number of draws for a ﬁxed number of players.
The eﬃciency gain is an index measuring how much is to be gained from an eﬃcient
allocation compared to the Nash equilibrium without negotiations and is deﬁned as:
X ¼W
P
i2N p
Nash
i
W
 100
where W is the sum of proﬁts in an eﬃcient conﬁguration, as before, and pNashi is the
proﬁt of farmer i in the Nash equilibrium without negotiations. X is the arithmetic
mean over all draws. Similarly, closing the gap is an index measuring what proportion
of the eﬃciency gain clubs on average realise. For a stable club S* it is deﬁned as:
C Sð Þ ¼
P Sð Þ þPi2NnS pSi 	Pi2N pNashi
WPi2N pNashi
with P Sð Þ the proﬁts of club S* and pSi the proﬁts of farmers outside of club S*. C is
the arithmetic mean of all C Sð Þ of stable clubs in one draw and C is the arithmetic
mean of all C in the number of draws under consideration.
Following Pintassilgo et al. (2010), we originally opted for 50,000 draws to investi-
gate the stability of clubs, which would have resulted in a standard deviation for the
stability likelihood of maximal 0.004. However, because a number of draws had
Table 1
Parameter values in the draws
Parameter Value
pC 110 (€/tonne)
pG 100 (€/tonne)
ci Integer 2 [1,25] (€/tonne)
aij e
1.5(distance)
11We refrain from calling this social gain because we do not model consumer eﬀects and trans-
action costs.
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multiple Nash equilibria in the last stage of the game, we increased the number of
draws by 10%, for a total of 55,000 draws.
The draws consisted of random cost vectors out of the range speciﬁed in Table 1.
We conducted 55,000 draws for a grid of four by three farmers. Because we sample
the costs for all the individual farmers at the same time, the maximum number of club
players, that is, the number of players in sets Φ and X, within a draw is determined by
the sampling procedure. Cost vectors were drawn such that there were always a mini-
mum of two farmers with Dp ci 0 and two farmers with Dp ci\0. In this way
the sets Φ and X always contained at least two members that could form clubs. Farm-
ers that had ci = 10 were assumed to be part of set Φ.
Runs were discarded if a Nash equilibrium in the last stage of the game was not
unique. The reason is that in this case there is a selection problem: it is unclear which
one of these multiple equilibria is to be used as a reference when the internal stability
of a club is checked.12 In addition, if there are multiple equilibria in the Nash equilib-
rium without negotiations, which is a last-stage Nash equilibrium as well, the indices
Eﬃciency Gain and Closing the Gap are not well deﬁned. The problem of multiple
equilibria occurs in 4% of the draws, except for the grid when GM farmers are liable,
where it occurs in 20%.
This procedure resulted in a very low number of draws for jUj ¼ 10 and jXj ¼ 2.
Therefore, we ran an additional 2,000 draws for both situations, using a diﬀerent sam-
pling procedure. In this procedure, we drew cost vectors such that, although ran-
domised, the sample always contained 10 farmers for whom Dp ci[ 0, resulting in
the desired jUj ¼ 10 and jXj ¼ 2. Their location within the 4 9 3 grid was random.
The results of the simulation remain qualitatively the same. The reason for the small
number of draws with jUj ¼ 10 and jXj ¼ 2 is twofold: the probability of drawing a
vector with jUj ¼ 10 and jXj ¼ 2 is low; and draws with jUj ¼ 10 and GM farmers not
liable face multiple equilibria in roughly 50% of the draws.
In Tables 2 and 3 we report the stability likelihood as well as the two indices from
our simulation results. Examples of typical draws are shown in Figure 1. Figure 1
shows that club members sometimes cultivate the crop type that their club addresses
in Coasean bargaining, for example the members of a GM-free club cultivate GM in
Figure 1, example 1. This is caused by assumptions (2) and (18). Assumption (2)
implies that potential club members are deﬁned in the absence of the externality.
These farmers represent farmers that are indiﬀerent between joining and not joining.
Our tie-breaking rule in (18) implies that farmers will join a club in that case.
From the tables we see that the eﬃciency gain is in general very small, almost
always below 1%. The main reason for this is the relatively small price premium for
non-GM crops. As a sensitivity analysis we use price premiums of 15%. Price premi-
ums of 15% are rare but are in principle possible for high value crops and seeds. The
results are shown in online Appendix S4. They are qualitatively the same. The main
diﬀerence is that when GM farmers are not liable, smaller clubs become more stable
and large clubs become less stable. When GM farmers are liable, smaller clubs become
less stable and large clubs become more stable, although the eﬀect is less pronounced,
12Alternative ways of dealing with multiple equilibria are checking whether the payoﬀ for play-
ers in the club is larger than the best payoﬀ of the multiple Nash equilibria (Olieman and Hen-
drix, 2006), or ensuring a dominant strategy (Dellink et al., 2008). Dominant strategies are not
present for all players in our game, and instead of making an additional assumption we opted
for discarding the draw altogether.
 2017 The Agricultural Economics Society
428 Maarten J. Punt and Justus Wesseler
T
a
b
le
2
S
ta
b
il
it
y
li
k
el
ih
o
o
d
a
n
d
p
o
te
n
ti
a
l
o
f
cl
u
b
s
in
a
g
ri
d
–
G
M
fa
rm
er
s
n
o
t
li
a
b
le
S
ta
b
il
it
y
li
k
el
ih
o
o
d
fo
r
cl
u
b
si
ze
m
E
ﬃ
ci
en
cy
g
a
in
 X
C
lo
si
n
g
th
e
g
a
p
 C
N
u
m
b
er
o
f
d
ra
w
s
m
=
1
m
=
2
m
=
3
m
=
4
m
=
5
m
=
6
m
=
7
m
=
8
m
=
9
m
=
1
0
M
a
x
im
u
m
n
u
m
b
er
o
f
cl
u
b
m
em
b
er
s
|Φ
|
=
2
0
.0
0
%
1
0
0
.0
0
%
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
0
.0
0
%
1
0
0
%
2
9
3
5
|Φ
|
=
3
0
.0
0
%
0
.6
4
%
9
9
.3
6
%
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
0
.0
0
%
9
6
.8
1
%
7
8
0
2
|Φ
|
=
4
0
.0
0
%
0
.2
4
%
2
.1
8
%
9
6
.9
9
%
–
–
–
–
–
–
0
.0
1
%
9
3
.9
8
%
1
1
8
6
1
|Φ
|
=
5
0
.0
0
%
0
.1
0
%
0
.9
4
%
5
.1
1
%
9
1
.0
3
%
–
–
–
–
–
0
.0
2
%
8
9
.9
4
%
1
2
7
1
6
|Φ
|
=
6
0
.0
0
%
0
.0
7
%
0
.6
5
%
2
.9
0
%
9
.3
9
%
7
8
.9
7
%
–
–
–
–
0
.0
6
%
8
5
.3
2
%
9
6
3
7
|Φ
|
=
7
0
.0
0
%
0
.1
9
%
0
.7
4
%
2
.4
1
%
6
.9
5
%
1
6
.5
4
%
5
4
.6
0
%
–
–
–
0
.1
8
%
7
8
.8
6
%
5
2
6
7
|Φ
|
=
8
0
.0
0
%
0
.2
9
%
1
.2
4
%
3
.4
8
%
7
.5
3
%
1
0
.6
7
%
1
6
.8
2
%
2
5
.6
3
%
–
–
0
.4
6
%
7
3
.1
3
%
2
0
9
9
|Φ
|
=
9
0
.0
0
%
0
.1
9
%
2
.0
4
%
5
.5
8
%
8
.7
4
%
9
.4
8
%
8
.9
2
%
7
.8
1
%
6
.5
1
%
–
0
.9
1
%
7
1
.9
9
%
5
3
8
|Φ
|
=
1
0
0
.0
0
%
1
.4
9
%
1
.4
9
%
4
.4
8
%
1
0
.4
5
%
7
.4
6
%
7
.4
6
%
2
.9
9
%
1
.4
9
%
0
.0
0
%
1
.3
3
%
7
3
.0
3
%
6
7
N
o
te
:
P
a
ra
m
et
er
s
a
s
in
T
a
b
le
1
.
T
h
e
g
ri
d
co
n
si
st
s
o
f
fo
u
r
b
y
th
re
e
fa
rm
er
s
w
it
h
a
lw
a
y
s
a
m
in
im
u
m
o
f
tw
o
fa
rm
er
s
th
a
t
w
o
u
ld
cu
lt
iv
a
te
n
o
n
-G
M
cr
o
p
s
in
th
e
a
b
se
n
ce
o
f
th
e
ex
te
rn
a
li
ty
a
n
d
tw
o
th
a
t
w
o
u
ld
cu
lt
iv
a
te
G
M
cr
o
p
s.
T
h
e
m
a
x
im
u
m
n
u
m
b
er
o
f
cl
u
b
m
em
b
er
s
is
d
et
er
m
in
ed
b
y
th
e
d
ra
w
it
se
lf
.
S
in
ce
d
ra
w
s
a
re
d
is
ca
rd
ed
w
h
en
th
er
e
a
re
m
u
lt
ip
le
N
a
sh
eq
u
il
ib
ri
a
in
th
e
la
st
st
a
g
e,
th
e
n
u
m
b
er
s
d
o
n
o
t
a
d
d
u
p
to
5
5
,0
0
0
.
 2017 The Agricultural Economics Society
Formation and Achievements of GM-Free and GM Clubs 429
T
a
b
le
3
S
ta
b
il
it
y
li
k
el
ih
o
o
d
a
n
d
p
o
te
n
ti
a
l
o
f
cl
u
b
s
in
a
g
ri
d
–
G
M
fa
rm
er
s
li
a
b
le
S
ta
b
il
it
y
li
k
el
ih
o
o
d
fo
r
cl
u
b
si
ze
m
E
ﬃ
ci
en
cy
g
a
in
 X
C
lo
si
n
g
th
e
g
a
p
 C
N
u
m
b
er
o
f
d
ra
w
s
m
=
1
m
=
2
m
=
3
m
=
4
m
=
5
m
=
6
m
=
7
m
=
8
m
=
9
m
=
1
0
M
a
x
im
u
m
n
u
m
b
er
o
f
cl
u
b
m
em
b
er
s
|X
|
=
2
0
.0
0
%
1
0
0
.0
0
%
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
0
.0
1
%
1
0
0
.0
0
%
1
2
2
|X
|
=
3
0
.0
0
%
4
.4
2
%
9
5
.5
8
%
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
0
.0
3
%
9
4
.8
7
%
6
7
8
|X
|
=
4
0
.0
0
%
2
.4
3
%
1
4
.4
7
%
7
9
.6
5
%
–
–
–
–
–
–
0
.1
3
%
9
0
.5
7
%
2
,2
6
0
|X
|
=
5
0
.0
6
%
2
.6
1
%
1
1
.8
4
%
2
6
.5
4
%
4
5
.3
2
%
–
–
–
–
–
0
.3
9
%
8
5
.3
9
%
5
,0
1
5
|X
|
=
6
0
.0
4
%
3
.5
4
%
1
1
.9
8
%
2
0
.3
1
%
1
8
.9
5
%
1
4
.2
8
%
–
–
–
–
0
.7
3
%
8
1
.0
7
%
8
,4
0
8
|X
|
=
7
0
.0
6
%
4
.4
1
%
1
2
.9
3
%
1
5
.8
4
%
1
1
.8
0
%
6
.5
7
%
3
.5
9
%
–
–
–
1
.0
2
%
8
0
.3
2
%
1
0
,3
3
9
|X
|
=
8
0
.1
7
%
5
.3
1
%
1
2
.2
6
%
1
3
.1
6
%
8
.0
4
%
4
.2
1
%
2
.5
6
%
2
.6
1
%
–
–
1
.1
4
%
8
0
.9
3
%
9
,0
3
2
|X
|
=
9
0
.4
4
%
6
.3
3
%
1
0
.5
2
%
9
.9
2
%
6
.9
1
%
4
.1
2
%
2
.4
1
%
2
.4
3
%
3
.3
6
%
–
1
.0
5
%
8
1
.6
7
%
5
,6
8
5
|X
|
=
1
0
0
.0
0
%
6
.2
4
%
7
.4
0
%
7
.5
9
%
5
.3
7
%
3
.7
7
%
3
.6
3
%
2
.4
7
%
4
.0
1
%
8
.9
9
%
0
.7
5
%
8
3
.4
6
%
2
,0
6
8
N
o
te
:
P
a
ra
m
et
er
s
a
s
in
T
a
b
le
1
.
T
h
e
g
ri
d
co
n
si
st
s
o
f
fo
u
r
b
y
th
re
e
fa
rm
er
s
w
it
h
a
lw
a
y
s
a
m
in
im
u
m
o
f
tw
o
fa
rm
er
s
th
a
t
w
o
u
ld
cu
lt
iv
a
te
n
o
n
-G
M
cr
o
p
s
in
th
e
a
b
se
n
ce
o
f
th
e
ex
te
rn
a
li
ty
a
n
d
tw
o
th
a
t
w
o
u
ld
cu
lt
iv
a
te
G
M
cr
o
p
s.
T
h
e
m
a
x
im
u
m
n
u
m
b
er
o
f
cl
u
b
m
em
b
er
s
is
d
et
er
m
in
ed
b
y
th
e
d
ra
w
it
se
lf
.
S
in
ce
d
ra
w
s
a
re
d
is
ca
rd
ed
w
h
en
th
er
e
a
re
m
u
lt
ip
le
N
a
sh
eq
u
il
ib
ri
a
in
th
e
la
st
st
a
g
e,
th
e
n
u
m
b
er
s
d
o
n
o
t
a
d
d
u
p
to
5
5
,0
0
0
.
 2017 The Agricultural Economics Society
430 Maarten J. Punt and Justus Wesseler
because free-riding makes forming large clubs harder. The reason for this movement
is that with higher price premiums the small GM-free clubs have a larger buying
power, and larger clubs are unnecessary to reach the eﬃcient outcome. Similarly, the
GM-only clubs have less buying power, and need larger clubs to reach an eﬃcient out-
come, but large clubs are hard to form.
Example 
number 
GM farmers not liable GM farmers liable 
ci Club size 
Club 
members 
Configuration Club 
size 
Club 
members 
Configuration 
1 
3 11 17 9 
12 5 23 2 
9 3 5 15 
0* 
0 - - 0
- 0 - 0
0 0 0 -
CV GM GM GM
GM GM GM CV
GM CV GM GM
0 
- 0 0 - 
0 - 0 - 
- - - 0 
CV CV CV CV
CV CV CV CV
CV CV CV CV
6** 
0 - - 1
- 1 - 1
1 1 1 -
CV GM GM GM
CV CV GM CV
CV CV CV GM
5** 
- 1 1 - 
1 - 1 - 
- - - 1 
CV CV GM GM
CV CV GM CV
CV CV CV GM
6** 
1 - - 1
- 0 - 1
1 1 1 -
CV CV GM GM
CV CV GM CV
CV CV CV GM
5** 
1 - - 1
- 1 - 0
1 1 0 -
CV CV GM GM
CV CV GM CV
CV CV CV GM
6** 
1 - - 1
- 1 - 1
1 0 1 -
CV CV GM GM
CV CV GM CV
CV CV CV GM
7 
1 - - 1
- 1 - 1
1 1 1 -
CV CV GM GM
CV CV GM CV
CV CV CV GM
Figure 1. Club formation in a grid
Note: Two example draws are presented. The ﬁrst column lists the number of the example
draw. The second column lists the ci of each farmer. Each square represents a club. In the
ﬁgure only the clubs that are fully stable as well as the Nash equilibrium (club size 0) and
the largest club (the last square) are shown. Club members are marked in grey and labelled
1, non-members are left blank and labelled 0. The members addressed through Coasean bar-
gaining are labelled with () and are not accounted for in club size. Internally stable clubs
are marked with *, fully stable clubs with **. The conﬁguration shows the corresponding
cultivation decisions by the club and the non-members. GM cultivation is marked hatched
and labelled GM, non-GM cultivation left blank and labelled CV. If it is in the interest of
the club, a club member (marked with 1) may continue to cultivate the variety that the club
tries to address in its Coasean bargaining, that is, a member of a GM-free club may con-
tinue to cultivate GM and vice versa.
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The eﬃciency gains are usually larger when GM farmers are liable than when they
are not liable, except for the setting that involves the largest maximum number of club
members. Consequently, when GM farmers are liable the diﬀerence between the Nash
equilibrium without negotiations and the eﬃcient conﬁguration is larger, and there
are larger potential beneﬁts for clubs to realise. However, realising all potential bene-
ﬁts by the clubs is diﬃcult. The tables show that, with exception of the setting where
Example 
number 
GM farmers not liable GM farmers liable 
ci Club 
size 
Club 
members 
Configuration Club 
size 
Club 
members 
Configuration 
2 
18 3 18 16 
16 11 8 23 
2 4 3 21 
0* 
- 0 - -
- - 0 -
0 0 0 -
GM CV GM GM
GM GM GM GM
CV CV CV GM
0* 
0 - 0 0 
0 0 - 0 
- - - 0 
G
M 
C
V 
G
M 
G
M 
CV CV CV
G
M 
CV CV CV
G
M 
5** 
- 1 - -
- - 1 -
1 1 1 -
GM CV GM 
G
M 
GM GM 
G
M 
G
M 
CV CV CV GM 
4** 
1 - 1 1 
0 0 - 0 
- - - 1 
G
M 
C
V 
G
M 
G
M 
G
M 
C
V 
G
M 
G
M 
CV CV CV
G
M 
   5** 
1 - 0 0 
1 1 - 1 
- - - 1 
G
M 
C
V 
G
M 
G
M 
G
M 
C
V CV
G
M 
CV CV CV
G
M 
   5** 
1 - 0 1 
0 1 - 1 
- - - 1 
G
M 
C
V 
G
M 
G
M 
CV CV CV
G
M 
CV CV CV
G
M 
   5** 
1 - 0 1 
1 1 - 0 
- - - 1 
G
M 
C
V 
G
M 
G
M 
G
M 
C
V CV
G
M 
CV CV CV
G
M 
   5** 
1 - 0 1 
1 1 - 1 
- - - 0 
G
M 
C
V 
G
M 
G
M 
G
M 
C
V CV
G
M 
CV CV CV
G
M 
   5** 
1 - 1 0 
0 1 - 1 
- - - 1 
G
M CV
G
M 
G
M 
G
M 
G
M 
G
M 
G
M 
CV CV CV GM 
   5** 
1 - 1 1 
0 1 - 1 
- - - 0 
G
M CV
G
M 
G
M 
G
M 
G
M 
G
M 
G
M 
CV CV CV GM 
   6** 
0 - 1 1 
1 1 - 1 
- - - 1 
G
M CV
G
M 
G
M 
G
M 
G
M 
G
M 
G
M 
CV CV CV GM 
   7 
1 - 1 1 
1 1 - 1 
- - - 1 
G
M CV
G
M 
G
M 
G
M 
G
M 
G
M 
G
M 
CV CV CV GM 
Figure 1. Continued.
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the maximum number of club members is two, clubs are never able to fully close the
gap. This is a result of free-riding: although it would be in the collective interest of the
group for all farmers to join and participate in buying out other farmers, it is not in
the individual interest of some of these farmers to join. Consequently, clubs that can
solve the externality problem completely are not stable and smaller clubs form, which
realise only a part of the potential beneﬁts. Although some smaller stable clubs are
also able to achieve an eﬃcient conﬁguration this does not hold for all of them (see
also Figure 1).
The eﬃciency gains increase when the maximum number of club members increases
because in the Nash equilibrium without negotiations there are more farmers cultivat-
ing the crop type that has the property rights. Many of these farmers would switch or
revert in an eﬃcient conﬁguration. When GM farmers are liable, the eﬃciency gains
decrease when the maximum number of club members becomes eight. The reason is
that there are relatively few non-GM farmers to compensate.
Although clubs consisting of the maximum number of club members have a rela-
tively large probability of being stable this probability declines steadily as the maxi-
mum number of club members increases (Tables 2 and 3). Clubs involving the
maximum number of club members have an especially low probability of being stable
once the maximum number of club members reaches eight when GM farmers are not
liable and six when they are liable (Tables 2 and 3). In part this is mitigated by an
increase in the probability of stability for smaller clubs. Although smaller clubs can
sometimes reach an eﬃcient allocation, it is clear from the closing the gap index that
they do not always succeed in doing so. The larger clubs are not stable because an
increasing number of potential club members implies there are more potential free-
riders as well as more possible clubs that potential members could free-ride on. This
in turn increases the claims of the free-riders and decreases stability.
Still, even though clubs are not able to realise the full gain, they do realise a sizeable
part of the gain. What the smaller clubs often do achieve is solving a local externality,
that is, an externality involving their direct neighbours. This can also be observed in
Figure 1, for instance in example 1 when GM farmers are not liable and in example 2,
when GM farmers are liable. Smaller clubs are able to realise the full potential eﬃ-
ciency gain when the maximum number of club members is small, but this typically
means that the gain is also small.
Although we have not explicitly modelled the ex-ante costs of regulation we can
infer some of their eﬀects through the model. If GM farmers are not liable, the costs
of ex-ante coexistence measures are shouldered by the non-GM farmers. Ceteris pari-
bus, this means that their ci increases. In contrast, if GM farmers are liable they have
to shoulder the costs, meaning that ci decreases as the incremental costs of farming
non-GM crops decreases. In order to investigate the eﬀect of ex-ante costs we look at
the eﬀect of the average ci for a ﬁxed maximum number of club members on the eﬃ-
ciency gain and closing the gap. The eﬀects for six players are presented in Table 4.
In Table 4 we observe the following: when GM farmers are not liable, the introduc-
tion of ex-ante costs increases the average ci. Such an increase in cimakes GM farming
relatively more attractive. Therefore, in the eﬃcient conﬁguration more farmers culti-
vate GM, and as the Nash equilibrium without negations favours GM cultivation as
well, the diﬀerence between these two allocations becomes smaller, decreasing the eﬃ-
ciency gain. When GM farmers are liable the introduction of ex-ante coexistence costs
decreases the average ci, making non-GM farming more attractive in both the Nash
equilibrium without negations and the eﬃcient conﬁguration, again decreasing the
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eﬃciency gain. In addition, we observe that the smaller the eﬃciency gain, the more
the clubs are able to realise this gain.
In total, these ﬁndings on ex-ante coexistence costs provide us with a mixed message
for clubs. On the one hand, clubs introduce ﬂexibility and lower ex-ante coexistence
costs. This drives up the diﬀerence between the Nash equilibrium and the eﬃcient con-
ﬁguration, increasing the potential gains from co-operation. However, this in turn
reduces the stability of the clubs, and less of the potential gain is realised by these
clubs due to free-riding.
5. Discussion and Conclusions
In this article we compare the eﬃciency of land allocation according to the Nash equi-
librium, with the eﬃcient allocation of land under two property rights systems and
several liability. We further investigated the stability of clubs that form to mitigate the
externality caused by the adventitious presence of GM crops under diﬀerent property
rights regimes. Using a simple farmer decision model combined with the notions of
stability that are generally used in the literature of international environmental agree-
ments, we derive the prospects for clubs under these diﬀerent liability regimes.
We ﬁnd that the Nash equilibrium without negotiation can already establish an eﬃ-
cient conﬁguration. The diﬀerences in eﬃciency gain between the eﬃcient allocation
of land and the Nash equilibrium are less than 5% at the maximum in both cases.
Although our model shows slightly larger gains if GM farmers are liable, given the rel-
ative size the diﬀerences between the two property rights systems can thus be consid-
ered negligible. These results have important implications for the debate on
coexistence. First, the allocation of property rights does not result in substantial dif-
ferences with respect to the eﬃciency of allocating land, that is, neither the EU where
the property right is with the non-GM farmer, nor the US system where the property
right is with the GM farmer, makes a diﬀerence from an economic perspective. Sec-
ond, having a coexistence policy that is based on ex-post several liability such as cur-
rently in the US, where the property right is more with the GM farmer, and Spain
where the property right is more with the non-GM farmer and farmers are free to
choose whether they like to cultivate GM crops or not, both result in an almost eﬃ-
cient allocation of land. This might explain why we observe almost no legal disputes
between GM and non-GM farmers. This result is further supported when we compare
our model set-up with real landscapes. We have considered a plain with no landscape
Table 4
Eﬀect of ex-ante costs in a grid
GM farmers not liable GM farmers liable
Average ci
Eﬃciency
gain X
Closing the
gap C
Number
of draws Average ci
Eﬃciency
gain X
Closing the
gap C
Number
of draws
<9 0.49% 78.30% 39 >13.5 0.97% 80.18% 432
9–10.5 0.14% 81.37% 1,145 12–13.5 0.83% 79.47% 2,939
10.5–12 0.07% 84.78% 4,692 10.5–12 0.73% 81.71% 3,919
12–13.5 0.03% 89.39% 3,326 9–10.5 0.40% 83.69% 1,074
>13.5 0.01% 91.14% 435 <9 0.04% 92.09% 44
Note:Maximum number of club members n = 6 for both liability regimes.
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structures such as roads, villages, hedges and trees. Those landscape structures act as
additional pollen barriers and reduce the diﬀusion of pollen more than as assumed in
our model.
In addition clubs very often realise a large part of the potential gain, albeit not
always. These ﬁndings are in line those of Furtan et al. (2007) who investigate the pos-
sibility that organic farmers form a club and buy out neighbouring GM farmers to act
as a buﬀer zone. They ﬁnd this to be an economically feasible solution. However, they
only investigate whether or not the club can compensate the reverting farmers, they
do not consider the outside option payoﬀ of the farmers in the club, or free-riding.
Our article adds an extra dimension to their results: the clubs they report could form,
but farmers do not necessarily have an incentive to stay in such clubs. Nevertheless,
our results conﬁrm theirs that the compensation principle holds.
The ﬁnding that club formation can realise a large part of the potential gain is in
contrast with the existing literature that uses very diﬀerent models but the same con-
cepts of stability and stability likelihood, for example in ﬁsheries and climate change
(see e.g. Dellink et al., 2008; Pintassilgo et al., 2010). There are three potentially inter-
acting reasons for the positive result about GM (or GM-free) clubs.
First of all it may be due to the relatively low potential eﬃciency gains. In the cli-
mate (Barrett, 1994) and the ﬁsheries literature (Pintassilgo et al., 2010), co-operation
becomes more diﬃcult when the gains increase, and becomes easier when the gains
are small. This, in turn, is due to the free-riding eﬀect. Large gains from cooperation
imply that there are large free-riding incentives. The opposite is true when gains are
small. A second reason for the club results is the functional form of the objective func-
tions chosen in the model. Karp and Simon (2013) have shown that this particularly
aﬀects stability. A third reason is the non-linear probability eﬀect that causes decreas-
ing marginal costs of switching from non-GM to GM crops, once others have
switched. This allows for economies of scale.
Although we perform some comparative statics regarding coexistence costs, we
do not consider the eﬀects of further regulations such as minimum distance require-
ments in our article. It has been shown that these regulations can aﬀect farmers’
decisions to cultivate GM or non-GM crops via the domino eﬀect (Groeneveld
et al., 2013). When regulations raise coexistence costs, clubs may oﬀer some ﬂexi-
bility to decrease the costs again, but as shown in the results of the simulations,
whether or not clubs are able to realise the full gains remains to be seen. The
model results presented here oﬀer grounds for scepticism, but as Skevas et al.
(2010) show it is possible in reality to have a club that realises the full gain. Never-
theless, our results show, without additional coexistence regulations, eﬃcient alloca-
tion and product diﬀerentiation can be achieved. This is not uncommon in crop
production as Kalaitzandonakes and Magnier (2016) and Pearsall (2016) have
pointed out and raises further questions about the economic beneﬁts of coexistence
regulations found in many EU Member States. Our results suggest many of those
(see, for example, Beckmann et al., 2014, for an overview) increase costs without
generating economic beneﬁts.
Our particular model has a few drawbacks. One is that we consider only the forma-
tion of a single club. In certain cases multiple clubs may form. However, we have also
shown that in certain cases the externalities can be mitigated by the formation of a sin-
gle club, in which case there is no reason to form multiple clubs. We also do not con-
sider the possibility of multiple ﬁelds, which would give farmers more ﬂexibility, and
the eﬀects of adventitious presence would probably be less severe.
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A further drawback is that we do not consider price eﬀects and cannot draw conclu-
sions about the overall welfare implications. However, our results will remain qualita-
tively the same if we include the demand side as this aﬀects prices, which have been
considered in the model. Finally, the model itself is static and, as such, dynamic incen-
tives are not considered. Thus it is assumed that bought-out farmers actually stick to
their decision and do not cheat. This is less of a problem where a non-GM farmer
becomes a GM farmer. In the case where a GM farmer becomes a non-GM farmer,
this might be diﬀerent. Even though we did not consider dynamic aspects explicitly,
cheating would not be economically eﬃcient in the long run. One can justify this
assumption in this context with an assumption of enforceable contracts. Future possi-
ble extensions of the model thus include equilibrium eﬀects in general and dynamic
formulations with possible enforcement issues. Further, considering the almost eﬃ-
cient allocation under the Nash equilibrium, we expect this will have only minor
eﬀects on the results.
In future research it is important to address two other important topics: ﬁrst, the
inﬂuence of spatial correlation and second, the eﬀect of using alternative probability-
distance functions. Spatial correlation may apply to the additional cost parameter. This
parameter is driven by many factors, but a number of the agroecological conditions are
likely to be spatially correlated. This means that potential GM farmers and non-GM
farmers are more likely to be clustered in the landscape anyhow. This in turn would
reduce the probability of adventitious presence. Similarly, neighbouring farmers often
face similar social norms, share societal values, and in case they rent the land, have the
same landowner. These factors are likely to make the negotiation easier, and bring
down the transaction costs of the clubs (e.g. Venus et al., 2017). We therefore hypothe-
sise that spatial correlation would make the formation of clubs easier.
We used a simple exponential function to describe the probability of adventitious
presence. However, a number of functional forms have been used in the literature, for
example, Bivariate student (Clark, 1998), Compound exponential (Damgaard and
Kjellsson, 2005), or Normal inverse Gaussian (Klein et al., 2003). The main diﬀerence
between these forms is in the dispersal distance and the fatness of their tails. An
increase in either of these two parameters would increase the probability of adventi-
tious presence.
We conclude there is scope for the voluntary formation of clubs that will result in
either GM-free zones or GM-only zones, depending on who has the property rights,
and that these clubs will usually be large but they are not always necessary to reach an
eﬃcient allocation.
Supporting Information
Additional Supporting Information may be found in the online version of this article:
Appendix S1: Proofs.
Appendix S2: Information on probabilities.
Appendix S3: Results for a line.
Appendix S4: Stability results when the price premium is 15%.
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